# **International trends in Military Justice**

Presentation by Arne Willy Dahl<sup>1</sup> at international law lunch meeting at Oslo University, November 23, 2011

Friends and colleagues,

Military justice is under scrutiny in several countries and by several international organizations.

My own organization, the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War, conducted a comparative study in 2001, presenting the results at a conference in Rhodes the same year. The study was a follow-up of a similar study for the 1979 congress of the society in Ankara, and was itself followed up in late September this year, the "Rhodes II" conference.

I will also mention work done by others, such as

- biannual conferences organized by the Hungarian national group of the society on various aspects of military jurisdiction and criminology, this fall focusing on certain human rights issues in military justice.
- The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with The International Commission of Jurists and Brazilian authorities organized an expert meeting in November 2007 on human rights and the administration of justice by military courts.
- In June 2009, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) organized a workshop for discussion of possible military jurisdiction reforms in selected countries, mainly Arabic.

There have also been other meetings and initiatives, among these a conference at Yale University in April this year and conferences in South Korea in 2010 and 2011. Put together, this activity shows a strong interest worldwide directed at military justice, much of it of a critical nature.

Assessing international trends in military justice, my point of departure is the 2001 study, where respondents among other questions also answered the following:

Please indicate whether there has been any recent discussion, evaluation or reform of your military legal system with reference to human rights such as those laid down in the European Human Rights Convention or other comparable instruments applicable to your country. Details should be reflected in the answers to the questions below.

Since 2001, I have gathered further information from individual contacts, visits etc., from presentations delivered at the bi-annual conferences organized in Hungary and from the Rhodes II conference. A full overview of developments in various countries will demand

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more time than we have available today, so I shall rather focus on a few countries and some general questions.

Among the driving factors, I think two deserve particular attention.

- 1) influence from Human rights quarters with regard to impartiality of courts, rights of the accused etc. and
- 2) a more diffuse tendency of distrust from the civilian society in general, which may lead to demands for reforms to counter any possibility of unwarranted acquittals or cases being swept under the carpet by a more or less self-contained military justice system.

We shall see how these play out in the developments that we have witnessed.

### **Simplification of trends**

There have been numerous changes in a large number of national military justice systems in recent years. To identify trends, one has to simplify matters, not drowning in details.

My first simplification, is to divide military justice systems into two groups. The 2001 survey made by the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War showed that the systems in 35 respondent states could be divided into "Anglo-American" systems based on courts-martial convened for the individual case, and "European continental" systems based on standing courts.

"Anglo-American" systems were first and foremost found in Great Britain and in her former colonies, while some states with "European continental" systems might have had systems resembling the "Anglo-American" in a more distant past. It should also be noted that several states have dispensed with military courts altogether, having military penal cases heard before civilian courts. In some states this might be a civilian court with some specialization or military element, in other states the court could be a fully civilian non-specialized court. The systems could also be different in peacetime and in wartime.

This leads me to distribute the various military justice systems along an axis – with the traditional fully military courts-martial system at the one end, and the fully "civilianised" system at the other.

Courts-martial	Standing	Specialized	General civilian	General civilian
convened for the	military	civilian courts	courts in	courts in peace
individual case	courts		peacetime	and war

All changes in military justice systems that are known to me have been from the left to the right in this table.

For a full picture one should also consider the position of the prosecutors. Do they belong to the military chain of command or are they independent? The focus of this presentation is on the courts, but it can be mentioned that similar developments have been seen with regard to the prosecutors. It should also be understood that most States have summary punishments systems for minor cases. These are also affected by developments.

### Military justice systems in certain countries

The military justice system of **Australia** has been heavily criticized in Parliament from 2006 onwards. A number of proposals have been put forward concerning independence, public inquiries and other matters focusing on the effectiveness of the system. One of the proposals was to introduce a standing court instead of the courts-martial system. This proposal was implemented in 2007, but declared unconstitutional by the Australian high Court in 26 June 2009. A recent proposal ("Military Court of Australia Bill") is to establish a standing deployable court of civilian judges who have military experience of knowledge of military affairs.

In **Belgium** military courts are abolished since 1 January 2004 in times of peace. The old law of 1899 was found to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The new law thus provided that that in times of peace the members of the Belgian army, even for crimes outside Belgium, are judged by the ordinary courts of Belgium. In times of war a new military court and a new procedure is created.

The system of military discipline in the **British Army** has undergone extensive change since 1996 to ensure that it more closely reflects the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Following the EctHR decision in Findlay v UK the UK Armed Forces Act 1996 revised the procedures to guarantee the objectivity and impartiality of courts-martial, largely by removing the conveners, court members, and prosecutors at courts-martial from the normal military chain of command.

It subsequently became clear that the British military summary dealing procedure was also very vulnerable to challenge under ECHR Art 6, and that procedure was consequently amended in the Armed Forces Discipline Act 2000, which for the first time allows soldiers to elect trial by court martial in all summary dealing cases if they choose, and even where they do not so elect they now have the right to appeal to a Summary Appeal Court (SAC). Jurisprudence has since upheld this system.

The latest piece of domestic legislation to affect the British system substantially is the Armed Forces Act 2006, which received Royal Assent at the end of 2006, and was implemented in 2009. The main purpose of this Act is simply to create a unified military discipline regime for all three services.

In **Canada**, the Supreme Court of Canada re-affirmed in 1992 the necessity for a separate military justice system with distinctive features, and the constitutionality of courts martial. In September 1999, significant reforms to the Military Justice System were implemented to modernize the system and ensure it reflects Canadian societal norms and values. This included the elimination of the death penalty, which had remained as a punishment in the Military Justice System although it has not been used since 1945.

Discussions about the Canadian military justice system has, however, surfaced again. In March 2011 the minister of National Defence announced that a review of the National Defence Act would be conducted to ensure that the military justice system is not too far out of step with the civilian system and is fair overall.

In **Finland**, the military prosecution system was reformed in 2001. Prosecution tasks were shifted from the military legal advisers to the public prosecutors in order to prevent any criticism with regard to possible influence of military authorities in court proceedings. Further

reforms are underway pursuant to a report of June 2009. The right to appeal a summary punishment is possibly the most interesting proposal.

In **Ireland** a comprehensive review of the Irish military law system has been undertaken, with a view to adapt to the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law and relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Since 2007, military cases are now heard by standing courts with permanent judges. The prosecutors are under the "Director of Military Prosecutions".

Recent changes in the military justice system of **New Zealand** is described in an article in The Military Law and the Law of War Review Volumes 3-4 2006. For the purpose of this presentation, the most important element seems to be a new court martial structure, ad hoc courts being replaced by permanent courts-martial. The right for the accused to elect trial by court-martial instead of being tried summarily has been increased, as is also the right to legal representation.

In the **USA**, recommendations for changes have been put forward in the *Cox report* from May 2001. One of the recommendations is to increase the independence, availability and responsibilities of military judges.

According to the report, complaints against the military justice system have long been fueled by allegations that military judges are neither sufficiently independent nor empowered enough to act as effective, impartial arbiters at trial. It is recommended to create standing judicial circuits, composed of tenured judges and empowered to manage courts-martial within geographic regions. It is also recommended to establish fixed terms of office for military judges, to enhance the overall independence of the military judiciary. It is believed that increased judicial independence is critical, given the central role of judges in upholding the standards of due process, preserving public confidence in the fairness of courts-martial, and bringing United States military justice closer to the standards being set by other military criminal justice systems around the world.

However, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the war on terror that has followed, has drawn the attention towards other matters, such as trial of suspected terrorists by military commissions, which is not on the agenda of this meting.

### **Human rights influence**

Human rights influence has been seen to be particularly strong in states party to the European Convention on Human Rights and states affiliated to such states, typically Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The reason for the particularly strong influence of the ECHR seems to be the access for aggrieved individuals to obtain binding decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. In such decisions, the Convention is not only applied, but also interpreted in a way that entails a measure of progressive development.

Highly relevant is Article 5 paragraph 1 (a) which lays down:

Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law; ...

Equally relevant is Article 6 paragraph 1 which lays down:

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.

These articles impose restrictions on the extent to which punishments can be awarded by summary procedures without due process. They also demand that military courts have to be independent, which means that you can't have a court composed of officers convened by a commander who may have an interest in the outcome. And although the courts may in fact act in a fully impartial manner, justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done.

#### **General distrust**

From time to time, there are eruptions of general distrust towards military courts on the part of the general public as represented by mass media and politicians. Criticism may be sparked by more or less unfortunate events, and is not necessarily well deserved.

For example, UK troops were involved in some nasty incidents in Iraq in 2003 and later. In cases where it has been decided there will be no prosecution the Army/Military police/Government have been accused of politically motivated cover-up. In other cases where there had been prosecution, one could hear voices asking "Why are you prosecuting anybody when they are all just trying to do a difficult and dangerous job on an operation that we should never have embarked on in the first place?"

Similar criticism has occurred in other countries. In countries where the military has a traditionally strong position, such as some Latin-American States, jurisdiction of military courts over civilians has been an issue.

In a wider group of countries, an issue has been to limit the jurisdiction of military courts to strictly military offences, thus leaving for instance cases on theft to civilian courts.

### **Counter-arguments**

What may be relevant and pertinent in a national peacetime perspective may, however, prove dysfunctional when troops are deployed abroad.

When soldiers commit crimes against local civilians whom they are supposed to protect, it does not make a good impression to put the accused on an airplane for prosecution at home. The local affected civilians need to see that justice is done, which is best demonstrated by having deployable courts. This does not go well together with a civilian justice system. In this connection it can be mentioned that Status of Forces Agreements typically allow for exercise of jurisdiction by sending State military courts, while civilian courts exercising jurisdiction on foreign territory is an anomaly.

Another factor is the increasing use of civilian contractors in conjunction with military forces. If military commanders have no summary punishment jurisdiction over such persons, and military courts that could be deployed have no penal jurisdiction over them, the end result could in practise be impunity. The potential of scandals, or at least complicated and inefficient prosecutions, is evident.

### **Conclusions**

There are clear trends in the development of military justice to be seen on the international scene with regard to the rights of the accused with reference to human rights standards. Important elements are:

- More independence to judges,
- Standing courts,
- Increased right to elect trial instead of summary procedures,
- Increased right to legal representation.

There are, furthermore, trends with regard to shifting from military to civilian jurisdiction, particularly in peacetime, by:

- Reducing the competence of military courts,
- Abolishing military courts,
- Abolishing military prosecution.

These trends are particularly visible in countries that are under influence of the European Convention on Human Rights.

## Response?

For people engaged in military justice and who have faith in their systems, it is painful to be the object of distrust and to have tasks taken away from them.

The response should, however, not be to argue against human rights protections. The relevant considerations, in my view, are twofold:

- 1) The prosecutors and courts must have sufficient access to areas where troops are deployed.
- 2) They must have jurisdiction sufficient to cover the relevant crimes and persons.
- 3) Military cases need priority and expertise. The military is one of very few branches of society where use of lethal force is permitted, and it is the only branch in which it is required that members take exceptional risks, risks that may entail giving up their lives, to accomplish their missions.

Military cases should be prosecuted, defended and judged by persons, who understand the life of soldiers and officers, the risks they face and the choices they have to make.

In a case related to a shooting incident in Iraq, the Appeals Chamber of the Arnhem court was quite critical of the public prosecutor's office and the way it had pursued this case, including its apparent lack of understanding of military operations.<sup>2</sup> It recommended that the public prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Defence establish dialogue and share knowledge to avoid the repetition of such a case.<sup>3</sup> (The case is described in the proceedings of the XVIIth Congress of the International Society for Military law and the Laws of War, Scheveningen 2006)

In this case, the court was up to its tasks, but the prosecution apparently not. Civilianization had seemingly gone one step too far.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The public prosecutors are civilians.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Excerpt from Dutch Military Law Review (Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, June 2005, p 213-224).

Thank you for your attention.